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MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
Pursuant to the provisions of the Inspector General Act of 1978, I am
required to report to the Congress twice a year concerning the activities
and accomplishments of this Office. This particular report, which covers
the period of April 1-September 30, 1979, is my first report to the
Congress as Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Labor.
As I discussed during my confirmation hearings, the Inspector General Act
has significantly affected traditional audit and investigative activities
within this Department, has created a more powerful organizational mechanism
to fight waste, fraud and abuse in Departmental programs and has provided
/
this Office with the statutory basis upon which to develop innovative
long-range strategies to promote economy and efficiency.
Since I officially began my duties on May i8, 1979, my principal objectives
have been to establish an effective organization to work on these objectives
and to develop a planning process that will result in well-designed
attacks on major systemic problems affecting waste, fraud and abuse in
Departmental programs and operations. Thenext semi-annual reportto
the Congress will reflect the fruits of•these organization-building
and planning efforts. In this message, I want to describe our plans.
The subsequent sections of this report reflect the results of activities
undertaken before I arrived. These sections do not reflect the results
of the changes I am now implementing. Thus, they should be only
marginally helpful to the Congress in evaluating the effectiveness of
this Office. My review of the following report strengthens my conviction
that traditional audit and investigative approaches will not in themselves
succeed in controlling waste, fraud and abuse in Department of Labor
programs. To have a real impact, what is needed is a combined audit and
investigative effort to design and implement strategic attacks on identified
•problem areas.
I am pleased with the progress we have made in the areas of organization-
building and planning, although there have been problems. In the area
of organization-building, let me first talk about our accomplishments.
This Office has had the great fortune of having attracted three outstanding
professionals to fill key managerial positions. Ronald Goldstock, the
Deputy Inspector General, brings to this position nationally-recognized
expertise in the criminal investigations area, especially organized
crime. Prior to beginning his duties in this Office on July 16, 1979,
he was Director of the Cornell University Institute on Organized Crime,
and, prior to that, Head of the Rackets Bureau in the New York District
Attorney's Office.
Our Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Edward W. Stepnick,,joined
our Office on July 30, 1979. He is an outstanding audit manager and I
feel fortunate that he decided to leave the position of Assistant
Inspector General for Audit at the Department of Health, Education,
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and Welfare to help us design and build our audit organization at Labor.
His 12 years with HEW were preceded by 15 years with the General Accounting
Office.
Our most recent senior level appointee is A. M. Statham, who joins our
staff on October 20, as Assistant Inspector General for Investigations.
He has had over 14 years experience with the U.S. Postal Inspection
Service, his most recent position being Assistant Postal Inspector in
Charge, in which he was responsible for managing mail fraud investigations
in seven western states and the Trust Islands of the Pacific. Mr. Statham's
experience in white collar crime investigations and his strong managerial
background provide him with exceptional credentials for this new position.
The recruitment proces s for these top positions took longer than I had
hoped. However, my strong belief is that our organization needs and
deserves the very best talent, and finding the right people for these
jobs was worth the wait.
In addition to the progress made in staffing, we have developed a new
organizational structure which I believe will provide the necessary
framework for effectively carrying out this Office's responsibilities.
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In addition to an Office of Audit, an Office of Investigations, an
Organized Crime Investigations Program Coordination Staff, an Administrative
Management Staff, and my own front Office, we are establishing an Internal
Affairs Staff, which will conduct investigations related to internal OIG
activities and personnel, and an Office of Loss Prevention and Analysis.
The creation and staffing of the Office of Loss Prevention and Analysis
will give the OIG the institutional base with which to carry out fully
the duties imposed by the Inspector General Act of 1978, and to help
the Department make the kind of long-term systemic improvements in program
efficiency and economy which the Act envisioned. We can no longer be
satisfied with exposure of the wrongdoer; we must develop procedures to
prevent or limit specific types of fraudulent and inefficient behavior
and resultant losses. The major focus of this new Office will be on
the prevention of losses due to fraud, dishonesty and mismanagement.
This Office will analyze the results of audits, investigations and other
materials to identify those fundamental, generic weaknesses in program
operations, policies and management which are conducive to waste,
fraud and abuse, and then work with Departmental managers to overcome
those weaknesses. The people who are being recruited for this Office
will have both program and analytical capabilities. In addition to its
central analytic role, this Office will perform the legislative and
regulations review, and intergovernmental liaison responsibilities
prescribed in the Act, coordinate our hot-line activities and our
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operational surveys, and perform research on new audit and investigative
methodologies and strategies. I look forward to highlighting the initial
efforts of this new Office in my next semi-annual report,
There are several factors which have affected the OiG's ability to
organize itself as quickly and as effectively as I had hoped. First,
I have been disappointed.b_ the time involved in processing personnel
actions and other management matters. I believe these have been cases
of systemic weaknesses, not deliberate nonfeasance. Second, a general
problem area that is facing most Inspectors General is that because the
concept and implementation of our Offices are relatively new, the skills
to manage effectively these new enterprises are in extremely short
supply. For example, there are very few top-notch investigative managers
in this country who have had experience in the white collar crime area.
Also, there is a real dirth of talent in the area of investigative
accounting, although this kind of specialization would be immensely
valuable to our Office. The entire personnel management and training
infrastructure will have to change significantly if skills needed by
these new Offices are to be developed and recruited. It is my hope that
the Inspectors General can collectively trigger the kinds of changes in
training and educational programs, and Federal personnel policies, which
are needed to generate more effective staffing for our Offices.
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My major thrust in planning this Office's activities is that of systematically
developing program strategies, and utilizing new and innovative investigative
and audit approaches. I believe that it is these new approaches, the
implementation of which was made possible by passage of the Inspector
General Act, which provide the best means of minimizing fraud, abuse and
waste. A fundamental underlying philosophy which is guiding much of our
planning is that audit and investigative resources must be brought together
to combat effectively waste, fraud and abuse in this Department.
Although the Inspector General Act requires separate audit and investigative
functions, we have found that sophisticated problems require joint audit
and investigative approaches for uncovering weaknesses and finding
solutions.
Another underlying theme, which I have alluded to before, is that our
goal is not the production of statistics (number of convictions, audit
reports, etc.) but to have a real impact on Departmental programs and
the way in which they are managed. This Department's investigative
program has been almost entirely geared to reacting to allegations. We
certainly cannot entirely refrain from responding to specific complaints,
but I do not believe that we have the luxury of investigating every
allegation of criminal activity. Similarly, in the audit area, we can
no longer restrict audit activities to single financial compliance
audits, cyclically scheduled on the basis of our annual audit universe.
We need to broaden our audit program to encompass more internal reviews
and more efficiency/effectiveness audits. And, we need to utilize audit
and other specialized skills in conducting complex program investigations.
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We are undertaking a number of special initiatives to help achieve
these objectives.
-- We have isolated a number of recognized problem areas and
are directing teams of auditors and investigators to uncover
actual instances of, and potential vulnerability to waste,
fraud and abuse.
-- We are actively _t_empting to make arrangements with state
and local law enforcement agencies to assist our efforts in
investigation and prosecution.
-- We have developed and are testing a surveillance audit guide
to aid auditors in uncovering instances of program fraud.
-- We are actively exploring the possibility of using intelligence
analysts so that sophisticated andanalytical skills can be
utilized in unraveling complex cases and uncovering trends.
-- We are enhancing our management information system so that we
will have an improved capability to track audit and investigative
accomplishments and to monitor improvements made based upon this
Office's recommendations.
-- We are developing the program-oriented loss prevention operation,•
which I described earlier.
In the organized crime investigations program, our goal is to develop
a series of investigative strategies and well-designed projects to
achieve real changes in the area of organized crime/labor racketeering
control. Each of the 14 Labor Department investigative units assigned
to Department of Justice Strike Force Offices is responsible for drafting
a mission statement and developing strategies designed to achieve the
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goals articulated in those statements. Individual cases will be undertaken
for the purpose of advancing these strategies. While this kind of
planning has not taken place before, most Strike Force Attorneys I have
met with are encouraged by our initiatives and welcome more concerted,
planned attacks on organized crime activity. Attached to this report is
the memorandum which has initiated this p!_nning and program effort.
(See Appendix A)
While the statute has given this Office many essential tools to insure
our effectiveness, the fact remains that often our ultimate success
depends upon the efforts of others. We rely on the Secretary for support;
we rely on Departmental program managers to alert this Office to incidents
of waste, fraud and abuse, and to implement recommendations developed as
a result of our audit activities; we rely on this Department's management
system for personnel, administrative services and financial support.
By and large, I believe that the Department has given adequate support
to this Office. The establishment and initial efforts of our Office
are having an effect on the Department's concerns about waste,
fraud and abuse. There is a greater sensitivity to these concerns, and
an increasing awareness of, and appreciation for the goals and activities
of this Office.
In summary, I am pleased with the progress this Office has made in acquiring
new goals, new staff and new planning approaches to enable us to carry
out effectively both the letter and spirit of the Inspector General Act.
Long-term control over waste, fraud and abuse within the Department of
8-
Labor has not been accomplished during the past six months and probably
will not be in the short-term. But that is the goal of this Office
and our efforts are geared to achieving that goal. During the past several
months, we have developed the capacity to meet this goal; the next six
monthslwill determine how effectively this capacity can be used.
MARJORIE FINE KNOWLES
Inspector General
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EXECUTIVESUMMARY
During the six-month period covered by this report, the Office of
Inspector General (OIG), of the Department of Labor (DOL), conducted
a number of significant audits and investigations. The problems disclosed
are described in detail in ChapterS 2 through 5 of this report. The
highlights of OIG's accomplishments for the period appear below.
A. Audit
-- 206 audit reports have been issued during the reporting
period, which question $78.9 million in costs.
-- The most frequent and significant problems identified by
these audits were ineligible participants in DOL programs,
insufficient documentation of expenditures, improper allocations
of administrative charges, and unresolved questioned costs in
subsponsor audits.
B. Investigations
Grant Fraud and Employee Integrity Investigations
-- 777 cases are open as of September 30, 1979.
-- 66 indictments have been returned and 39 convictions have
been obtained in cases in which OIG has participated.
-- a total of $441,420 in overpayments of Workers' Compensation
benefits to claimants have been detected.
Organized Crime Investigations
-- 323 cases are open as of September 30, 1979.
-- 13 individuals have been indicted, ii of whom were convicted.
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C. ADP Reviews
-- 7 ADP review reports were issued.
-- 3 of the reports identified significant problems or
deficiencies and made recommendations for correcting the
situations.
D. Fraud Prevention & Detection Activities
-- A special review of the Employment and Training Administration's
Summer Youth Employment Program was conducted by OIG.
-- A DOL OIG Hotline was installed during the reporting
period on which 66 complaints have been received.
- Ii-
INTRODUCTION
The Office of Inspector General (OIG), Department of Labor (DOL), was
established in October 1978, by the Inspector General Act of 1978,
Public Law 95-452. The purpose of OIG is to: (I) recommend policies
to prevent and detect fraud, abuse and waste in DOL programs and operations
and increase their economy and efficiency; (2) conduct, supervise and
coordinate audits and investigations relating to DOL programs and operations;
and (3) keep the Secretary of Labor and Congress informed about problems
and corrective action taken in the administration of DOL programs and
operations. To accomplish this, the majority of DOL's audit and investigative
activities, which include fraud and employee integrity invesEigations,
the Organized Crime Strike Force investigations and Automated Data
Processing (ADP) reviews, have been consolidated within the O_.
On May 18, 1979, Marjorie Fine Knowles was sworn in as the Inspector
General of the Department of Labor. She came from the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, where she served as Assistant General Counsel
for the Inspector General Division.
Chapter I of this report briefly reviews our new organizational structure,
and our present and future resources. The following three chapters deal
with the activities and accomplishments of OIG's audit, investigations
and ADP units during the reporting period. The report concludes with a
review of the special activities that OIG has implemented to detect
and prevent fraud, abuse and waste in DOL programs and operations
during the reporting period.
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CHAPTER I. ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES
A. Organizational Structure
OIG is in the process of staffing a new organizational structure through
which efforts to identify and prevent fraud, waste and abuse can be more
efficiently directed. There are six major organizational components
which will report directly to the Inspector General an_ the Deputy
Inspector General. These components are: Office of Audit, Office of
Investigations, Office of Loss Prevention and Analysis, Organized Crime
Investigations Program Coordination, Administrative Management and
Internal Affairs. Attached to this report is a copy of the recently-
approved organization chart. (See Appendix B).
The Office of Audit is headed by the Assistant Inspector General for
Audit, Edward Stepnick, who is responsible for planning and implementing
the audit program of the OIG. The bulk of the audit work is performed
in the field offices located in each of the ten DOL regional cities
across the country and headed by an audit field supervisor who reports
to the Assistant Inspector General for Audit.
The Office of Investigations will be headed by the Assistant Inspector
General for Investigations, A. M. (Mac) Statham, who is responsible for
the conduct of all program fraud and employee integrity investigations.
There are eleven investigations field offices: one in each of the ten
DOL regional cities and a Washington, D.C. field office. The supervisory
investigator in each of these offices reports to the Assistant Inspector
General for Investigations.
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The Offices of Audit and Investigations were part of the Office of
Special Investigations , which, by force of the Inspector General Act,
became tbe Office of Inspector General.
The third major component will be the Office of Loss Prevention and
Analysis. This new unit will initially be located in the National
Office and will be comprised of two divisions that will be responsible
for the analytic, research, liaison and planning work described earlier.
The fourth component, the Organized Crime Investigations Program Coordination
Staff, will report to the Deputy Inspector General and is responsible
for conducting investigations of organized crime activities in organizations
or programs under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor. There are
14 Organized Crime Investigations field offices which work with the
Strike Forces of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and are located
in cities targeted by DOJ°
The fifth component is the Administrative Management Staff which is
responsible for providing administrative and management support to all
OIG components.
The sixth component, the Internal Affairs Staff, will be responsible for
inspecting OIG's audit and investigative operations, and recommending
action to improve and assure the integrity of OIG staff and operations.
This staff will report directly to the Inspector General.
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B Resources
(i) Current Resources
OIG had 355 authorized positions for FY 1979. Since most of
these positions were new in the beginning of the fiscal year,
OIG was not able to hire many of its needed staff until the
hiring freeze was lifted in JanuaLy, i979. Since then OIG
has made major efforts to achieve full staffing. As of
September 30, 1979, OIG has a total of 336 professional, technical
and clerical staff on board: 158 in the Office of Audit;
75 in the Office of Investigations; 81 in the Organized Crime
Program; 16 on the Administrative Msnagement Staff; and 6
in the Immediate Office of the Inspector General.
(2) Future Resources
In FY 1980 OIG has been authorized by Congress to increase its
staff by 132 positions. Audit will receive 59 positions for
performing unified audits of 17 complex CETA prime
sponsors and Investigations will receive 37 positions. An
additional 36 positions will be used to plan and coordinate
OIG work in the manner previously described. These positions
will raise the total authorized staff for OIG to 487 positions.
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(3) Contract Funds
In addition to work performed by its own audit staff, OIG
relies on funds to contract with outside auditors to conduct
a large portion of its audits. In FY 1979 OIG received
$i million in its own budget for contracting for audit
services, and an additional $8 million from the Employment
and Training Administration for contract audits performed
in the CETA program. The bulk of these funds were used
to hire Certified Public Accountants, with a much smaller
amount provided to state and local audit agencies. For
FY 1980 Congress has placed $12.8 million directly into
OIG's budget for audits of the CETA program and $i million
for audits of other program areas.
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CHAPTER 2. AUDIT ACTIVITIES
A. Audit Responsibilities
The major objectives of the OIG's audit program are to review and audit
DOL programs and funds to ensure fiscal accountability, regulatory compliance,
economical and efficient operations, and to seek improvements in DOL
programs.
The majority of OIG audits relate to funds awarded to DOL grantees,
subgrantees and contractors. Generally, these are financial and compliance
audits performed in accordance with annually updated audit guides
specifically designed for each DOL program. These external financial
and compliance audits cover the following programs.
(i) Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
The amount b_dgeted for CETA for FY 1979 was $ii billion dollars.
In FY 1979, CETA funds were distributed to approximately 460
state and local prime sponsors who in turn distributed funds
to approximately 40,000 subsponsors and contractors. The
number of CETA prime sponsors will increase to 473 in FY 1980.
CETA funds are also distributed to approximately 174 Native
American Sponsors, 80 Migrant and other Seasonally Employed
Farmworker Program Sponsors, 76 Job Corps Centers and 160
other contractors. The number of Job Corps Centers is expected
to increase in FY 1980 to approximately 120. CETA audits
are very complex because of the decentralized program operations.
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(2) State Employment Security Agencys (SESAs)
The amount of federal and state funds budgeted for employment
security and unemployment insurance programs for FY 1979 was
approximately $13 billion. These funds were distributed to
54 states and territories to operate over 2,400 local offices
providing employment services, unemployment benefit payments,
disaster relief and trade readjustment allowances. SESAs
operate as a state-federal partnership, with the DOL responsible
for providing basic standards, and administrative funds and
direction.
(3) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
In FY 1979, OSHA awarded 24 operational grants to states for
performing safety and health inspections; 39 reimbursable
contracts for services and research; and 86 training and
educational grants to colleges and universities, trade unions,
industries, and trade associations. In addition, OSHA awarded
50 statistical grants to the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
5 statistical grants directly to states to accumulate safety
and health data.
(4) Mine Safety & Health Administration (MSHA)
The Mining Enforcement Safety Administration, previously a part
of the Department of Interior, was transferred to the Department
of Labor as the Mine Safetyand Health Administration and
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reorganized with additional responsibilities. In FY 1979
MSHA contracts and grants amounted to approximately $13 million.
These contracts covered supplies, construction studies and training
conducted by approximately 25 states for mine safety and
health programs.
Internal audits of the Department's activities are also the responsibility
of the Office of Audit. To date, 87 program and functional areas have
been identified as subjects for internal audits. In addition, nationwide
special impact studies are conducted of selected activities which are
believed to require the special attention of Departmental management.
These audits address compliance, efficiency and economy.
B. Audit Universe and Audit Resources
In FY 1979 OIG had funds and audit staff available to provide coverage
of approximately half of the annual audit universe. OIG anticipates
that an additional 53 auditors and 6 support staff will be available
in FY 1980 to perform unified audits of 17 larger and more complex
CETA prime sponsors. We will also have $12.8 million to contract with
outside auditors to perform audits of the CETA program.
Table 1 is a summary of the audit universe and audits performed in
FY 1979. Table 2 shows the audits performed during the reporting •
period by performance group.
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TABLE 1
Summary of OIG Audit Universe and
Actual Accomplishments
Universe Accomplishments
Audit Activity Total i/ Annual 2/ ist Half FY 1979 2nd Half FY 1979
CETA Title I, II, & VI Prime 460 230 70 55
Sponsor Audits
CETA Title III Native American 174 174 61 104
Audits
CETA Title III Migrant Audits 80 80 2 1
CETA Title IV Job Corps 3/ 120 120 -- ii
CETA Subsponsor Report 40,000 20,000 3,840 9,910
Reviews
ONP/OPER/Miscellaneous Audits 85 85 26 19
SESA Audits 54 27 9 4/ 8
OSHA Audits 55 27 8 1
BLS Audits .... 1 2
MSHAAudits 55 27 -- 2
Internal Audits 83 29 2 3
i/ The total audit universe represents the total number of entities for which OIG
has audit responsibility.
2/ The annual audit universe is the number of entities which OIG is required to
audit in a year to maintain timely audit cycles. Audit cycles vary from
one to three years depending on the program being audited.
3/ The actual number of funded Job Corps centers was 75 in FY 1979. The anticipated
number for FY 1980 is 120.
4/ SESA audits covered federal administrative costs and federal benefits and
allowances. State UI benefits were tested in one audit.
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TABLE 2
Audits Performed April 1 - September 30, 1979
By Performance Group
Dollars Percent of
Number of Percent of Audited Dollars
Performance Group Reports Issued Reports Issued (Millions) Audited
DOL Auditors 40 19% $1,806.6 73%
CPAs 136 66% 336.5 14%
State and Local Auditors 20 10% 319.2 13%
Other Federal Auditors l0 5% 1.9 --
TOTAL 206 100% $2,464.2 100%
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Sisnificant Activities
-- Unified Audits - The concept of a unified audit of a single
CETA prime sponsor and its subsponsors, described in the previous
semi-annual report, is well on the way to becoming operational.
As indicated earlier, fifty-nine new audit positions are expected
for Fiscal Year 1980 which will be used for unified audits of
17 CETA prime sponsors. This will provide a continuous audit
presence, or residency, that should help us to pinpoint problems
earlier, make audits more current, more efficiently utilize
scarce audit resources, and lower audit costs. We would like
to expand residencies to additional prime sponsors in Fiscal
Year 1981 if resources permit.
-- Maintenance of a Precedent File - A precedent file has been
established consisting of Opinions of the Solicitor, decisions
by Administrative Law Judges, and Opinions of the Comptroller
General which impact on DOL audit operations. This file will
assist OIG auditors in conducting their work and in discussions
with program officials on the resolution of audit exceptions.
-- Surveillance Audit Guide - As stated in the report for the
period October i, 1978-March 31, 1979, we have developed a
surveillance audit guide to aid OIG personnel in detecting
internal concealed program theft. This guide contains an
internal control survey section as well as fraud detection
procedures. We should complete testing of the guide in
November, 1979.
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D. Significant Audit Findings and Recommendations
During the current reporting period, OIG issued 206 audit reports which
questioned $78.9 million. _/ Since only a sample of all costs are
normally audited, the dollars that we have questioned are based on
actual dollars audited, not on a statistical sampling projection of the
total dollar impact. Table 3 depicts the number of reports issued and
dollars questioned, by program; a detailed listing of these reports
is contained in Appendix C.
Some of the more frequent and significant problems found in D0L programs
were ineligible participants in DOL grant programs, insufficient documenta-
tion of expenditures, improper allocations of administrative charges
and unresolved questioned costs in subsponsor audits. Deficiencies were
also found in other aspects of the administration of DOL funds by grantees
and contractors. All too frequently we noted: (i) weak financial manage-
ment and internal controls; (2) inadequate accounting systems; (3) poor
cash management; and (4) lax property management. These, and additional
problems found in DOL programs, and our recommendations for corrective
action are set forth below.
_/ Questioned costs are those costs for which there is either a lack
of documentation to support the costs' allowability, or for which
the documentation showed that the cost was unallowable.
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(i) State and Local CETA Program Audits
OIG issued 55 audlt reports on state and local CETA Programs
which questioned $42.1 million. It should be noted
that prime sponsors are responsible to the Department for
all CETA funds granted to them, even though the program may be
administered through subgrantees. A summary of the major
reasons for the questioned costs is shown below:
Percent of Total
Audit Exception Dollars Questioned
Unresolved Subsponsor Audit 47
Exceptions
Improper Allocation of 12
Administrative Charges
Insufficient Documentation i0
Ineligible Participants 7
Other Improper Expenditures 4
Exceeding Budget 2
Other 18
TOTAL 100%
In order to illustrate the types of problems we found, several
of the significant state and local CETA audit reports are
discussed below.
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-- We found that CETA funds had been misappropriated byan employee
of a sponsor and several outside vendors. Approximately
$293,000 of CETA funds were paid to selected vendors who appear
to have been involved in the scheme. A proper system of internal
controls could have diminished the opportunity for misappro-
priation. The Department of Justice is currently investigating
his m _t atter. _.-- ..... '
. .- . . . • . .
-- In one report, audit0rsquestioned approximately $3.1 million
(prime level) and $1.5 million (subgrantee level). A significant
finding was that the CETA prime sponsor cash control account
had not been reconciled with a separate city account of CETA
cash transactions. The auditors determined that the city
account reflected $473,241 more disbursements than the amounts
recorded as disbursed on the CETA records. A recommendation
was made that the CETA cash control account should be reconciled
with the city's account at once, and that such reconciliation be
a regular monthly procedure.
-- In another report, auditors questioned $446,000 (prime level)
and $1,249,000 (subcontractor level) mainly for lack of
documentation, ineligible participants, wages paid in excess
of the maximum allowable under CETA regulations, and unresolved
subcontractor audit reports. The auditors issued an adverse
- 25 _
opinion on the CETA financial statements as a result of the
lack of control over obligations in total, and by individual
subcontractors, and the fact that changes were made by the
prime sponsor to subcontractor expenditure reports without
subcontractor knowledge.
-- An OIG audit of a CETA program questioned $2 million at the
subgrantee level. The major reasons for these questioned
costs were missing participant payroll checks, wage records
and applications; nepotism; improperly approved time cards
for staff and participants; lack of proper source documentation
and failure of the contractor to report administrative costs
allocated by program activity.
-- An OIG audit of a CETA program questioned $655,000 due to
insufficient documentation. Personnel action forms and
notifications of employment, which are necessary to determine
if salaries paid to the staff are appropriate, were missing
from the personnel files of staff members. In addition,
job descriptions, required qualifications, results of interviews
or evaluation of qualifications could not be located for 42
summer aide positions.
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(2) Job Corps Prosram Audits
During the reporting period, ii Job Corps Center audit reports
were issued which questioned $5.3 million. The questionable
items in the samples examined are reflected in the table below:
Percent of Total
Audit Exception Dollars Questioned
Staff Salaries and Fringes
Exceeding Contract Budget 18
Unqualified Staff Ii
Improper Certification or 6
Licensing of Staff
Insufficient Documentation 3
Procurement of Goods and Services
Bidding Procedures 3
Equipment, Construction and Rehabilitation Cost
Unsupported Accounts Payable 47
General and Administrative Costs 3
not Accurately Applied
Enrollee (Corps member) Expenses 3
Procurement of Capital Equipment 2
Insufficient Documentation 2
Lack of DOL Approval 1
Lack of Accountability of Non- 1
Expendable Capital Equipment
TOTAL 100%
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Two of the more significant Job Corps Center audit reports are
summarized below.
-- A report questioned approximately $3,000,000 primarily
because costs reported for equipment, construction, and
rehabilitation could not be verified. The majority of these
dollars were resolved when the grantee amended the financial
statements.
-- Another report disclosed operating costs and general and
administrative expenses in excess of the amount specified in
the contract; construction, rehabilitation and site consolidation
which lacked prior approval; and hiring of unqualified staff.
Approximately $623,000 was questioned in the report which was
sent to the Employment and Training Administration (ETA).
(3) National CETA Program Audits
(a) Summary of Native American Program Audits
During the reporting period, OIG issued 104 audit reports for
the Native American Program. These audits questioned $13.3
million, either because the costs were insufficiently documented
or improper. The major problem areas were:
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Percent of Total
Audit Exception Dollars Questioned
Insufficient Documentation 35
Improper Allocations 24
Expenditure Over Budget 8
Ineligible Participants 6
Other Improper Expenditures 4
Other 23
TOTAL 100%
(b) Summary of Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers Program Audit Activity
Only one audit report was issued. It disclosed that the grantee's
financial management system (I) did not provide for accurate,
current, and complete disclosure of the cash position; (2) did
not provide records which adequately identified the source and
application of funds for grant-supported activities; and
(3) did not provide effective control over and accountability
for all funds, property and other assets. In addition, the
grantee did not maintain cash disbursements journals for either
of the two CETA bank accounts and did not have an adequately
documented plan for allocation of the costs of services shared
by the CETA Title III, Section 303 and other grants funded
by federal agencies. As a result, $26,209 were questioned.
It was also recommended that $3,604 be disallowed because there
were allowance payments to ineligible participants and costs
incurred after the expiration of the grant.
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(c) Summary of Other National Programs, Office of Policy,
Evaluation and Research_ and Miscellaneous Audits
During the period, OIG issued 19 audit reports on grants and
contracts under the Older Americans Act and for research and
evaluation work. The audits resulted in $304,743 of questioned
costs as shown in the table below.
Percent of Total
Audit Exception Dollars Questioned
Ineligible Participants 47
Insufficient Documentation 28
Other Improper Expenditures 7
Improper Allocation of Administrative 3
Charges
Exceeds Budget 2
Other 13
TOTAL 100%
Enrollee costs were questioned because their incomes exceeded
the allowable limits for eligibility under the Older Americans
Act; costs were questioned for insufficient documentation
because of incomplete or missing intake forms.
(4) State Employment Security Agency Audits
OIG issued eight State Employment Security Agency (SESA)
audit reports during the period. The questioned items in
samples examined were $17.9 million.
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Percent of Total
Audit Exception Dollars Questioned
Improper Allocation of 46• i•
Administrative Charges _ •_•
Insufficient Documentation ',•37.,,_-.•• _•_,
":7._.I_'::i/"i ' " i: " TOTAL'. :"ii!."i".":".' :" .:."/ 'i:'i .:'_i ':-:i_:.... .i=:i:i00%,, . .. " )_?!':i::'::'i:ii.:):?.:.ii;.' :./-.." .
One SESA audit report questioned $2;337,000 for contractual; ,ii ",:_
service agreements •which were made without obtaining either •i•_•
competitive bids or the required prior•approval of the Employ-
ment and Training Administration. The audit also disclosed
that material weaknesses existed in the SESA's Accounting
System, and ADP transactions from the SESA's Accounting
System were not retained. Recommendations were made for
corrective action on each of these findings.
Another SESA report disclosed a wide variety of management
problems such as inadequate controls over returned benefit
checks; lack of procedures to insure that the claimant was
available and actively seeking work; little or no effort
to collect overpayments from claimants; and inadequate billing
and collection procedures for judgments issued against employers
for contributions. The report also found that since the Social
Security Administration no longer allowed the state to match
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benefit payments to wages reported on the Social Security
files, the SESA had inadequate controls to detect unemploy-
ment compensation overpayments and payments to ineligibles.
(5) Special Impact/Internal Audits
Three internal audits were completed during the period, two
of which are summarized below.
-- An internal audit of Federal Employees' Compensation
Act (FECA) periodic roll case management was performed
at the request of the Assistant Secretary for the Employment
Standards Administration (ESA). In the 220 periodic roll
case files we examined, deficiencies were found in 174
cases. Deficiencies in the adjudication of claimants'
initial eligibility and in the monitoring of claimants'
continuing eligibility were the principal problems. A crossmatch
of 180 selected claimants to State Employment Security Agency
wage and unemployment insurance records disclosed that
17 claimants had employer-reported earnings and 12
claimants had received unemployment insurance benefits;
all 29 claimants were also receiving Federal employees'
compensation for total disability.
We recommended that ESA direct improved compliance with
Office of Workers' Compensation Program requirements and
revise certain procedures. We also recommended that they
increase utilization of their existing automated case
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management file, develop a definition of "total disability",
and require periodic crossmatches of total disability
periodic roll cases with appropriate wage records.
Corrective action was taken in accordance with some of
our recommendations.
-- The office of Inspector General has completed an internal
review of contract and grant close-out procedures in ETA.
The Objectives of the audit were to determine:
-- whether procedures used for handling close-outs are
consistent with OMB Circulars A-f02 and A-IIO;
-- the number of completed or terminated contracts
and grants with outstanding advances or unreported
costs; and
-- the amount of interest cost (advances had not been
liquidated or returned to Treasury).
In summary we found:
-- a need to revise close-out procedures in order to
fully comply with OMB Circulars;
-- an excessive number of contracts and grants pending
close-out with outstanding advances or unreported costs;
-- failure to deposit refund checks on a timely basis.
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In order to improve the close-out process, ETA has
established a short-range priority to eliminate the
backlog, and a long-range priority to establish adequate
controls to prevent similar accumulations in the future.
In addition, ETA has: (1) issued instructions to clarify
the reporting of close-out activity, (2) provided training
for Federal Authorized Representatives, (3) provided
technical assistance to prime sponsors, (4) hired a
contractor to expedite close-outs, and (5) implemented
a tracking system for close-outs and for the settlement
of audit questions.
E. Audit Resolution and Significant Recommendations Made in the Last
Semi-Annual Report
Since the period covered in the first semi-annual report of the Inspector
General (10/1/78-3/31/79), DOL management has continued to emphasize
the need for correcting audit resolution and debt collection shortcomings.
Data systems for tracking audits, accounts receivables, and debt
collection are under development.
Tables 3 and 4 depict resolution activity in the current reporting period,
and the age of unresolved audits as of September 30, 1979.
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The number of unresolved pre-CETA categorical audits has been reduced
by 57% this fiscal year but the total number of unresolved reports
did not decline. The Employment and Training Administration has recently
established an active program which includes monthly assessments of resolution
activity and a time-table for eliminating the Department's audit resolution
problem. The program's objective is the timely resolution of CETA state
and local as well as pre-CETA questioned costs. OIG will continue to
monitor this effort.
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CHAPTER 3. INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITIES
A. Objectives and Responsibilities
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the following material
relating to the OIG's investigative program describes the organization
and activities during the reporting period. As described in detail
elsewhere, the structure of our organization has recently changed. The
results of investigations described below reflect activities begun at an
earlier time under the prior organizational structure.
(i) Grant Fraud, Employee Integrity and Workers' Compensation
Grant fraud investigations deal with allegations of fraud in
the CETA program, in other DOL grant programs, DOL contracts and
in various other programs administered by the Department
(e.g., Trade Readjustment Act). The Employee Integrity area
encompasses allegations made against DOL employees. Workers'
Compensation investigations cover fraud involving payments
made to claimants under the Federal Employees' Compensation
Act (FECA), the Black Lung Benefits Act and various other related
Acts.
The majority of OIG investigations conducted in the reporting
period resulted from complaints received from Congress, the
General Accounting Office (GAO), the public, the media, other
Federal agencies and internal DOL sources. These complaints
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are in the form of GAO hotline summaries, DOL hotline
complaints, letters, newspaper articles and Incident
Reports, a DOL form used by DOL employees and CPA firms for
reporting instances of suspected fraud or abuse.
In addition to conducting investigations in response to a
specific complaint, the OIG is now beginning to conduct pro-
active investigations in selected high-risk program areas.
The Fraud and Abuse Prevention Survey, which is a form of
pro-active investigative work, is discussed in more detail
in Chapter 5 of this report.
(2) Organized Crime
The Department of Labor's Organized Crime INvestigations
Program was established in coordination with the Department of
Justice Strike Force Activity in order to participate in
investigations relating to labor unions and labor laws administered
by DOL, and to aid in the implementation of programs designed
to control organized crime activity in the labor-management
area. This effort is a high priority of both the Justice
Department and DOL.
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There are 14 Justice Department Strike Force Offices located
in major cities with OIG Organized Crime Investigative staff
assigned to each. All investigations are conducted under the
guidance of the Justice Department Strike Force Attorneys.
B. Case Workload and Investigative Resources
As of September 30, 1979, OIG had 777 open grant fraud, employee integrity,
and workers' compensation cases. These investigations were being conducted
by 44 field agents. As of September 30, 1979, the OIG Organized Crime
Program had 323 open cases, being handled by 74 investigators.
TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF CASES OPENED AND CLOSED
April i, 1979 - September 30, 1979
Complaints
Case Type Closed i/ Cases Opened Cases Closed
Employee Integrity 8 117 25
Grant Fraud 137 272 148
Workers' Compensation 35 67 85
Other 9 4 1
Organized Crime 8 157 23
TOTAL 197 617 282
i/ A complaint is defined as the original notification of an allegation.
Complaints which are unsubstantiated allegations or which should be
referred to other DOL program agencies (e.__, safety violations
referred to OSHA) are closed. Other complaints are given case numbers
and investigated.
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Cases are frequently not investigated in the order they are opened.
Because of staff limitations and the large geographic areas that must be
covered, the investigators have sought to maximize their effectiveness
by working several cases in the same geographic area or by working related
cases which stem from a single investigation. Deadlines imposed by
statutes of limitations and priorities within the U.S. Attorneys
Offices often require resources to be diverted to such priority cases.
In the Strike Force Offices, it is ultimately the chief attorney's
decision as to which case or cases are to be actively investigated and
which are to be closed.
C. Significant Investigative Findings and Action Taken
(I) Employee Integrity
-- An OIG investigation revealed that five DOL employees in the
Office of Accounting had received a total of $13,000 by
manipulating computer-generated payroll checks. Two of the
employees have pleaded guilty and pleas on two others are
expected shortly. Restitution of the funds is being made.
Administrative action has been initiated against all five employees.
-- An OIG investigation of a complaint of an illegal appointment
has led to the termination of an ETA manager. The investigation
was coordinated with the Office of Personnel Management and
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the Department of Justice. Repayment of the manager's salary
for the term of illegal appointment is currently being
negotiated by the General Accounting Office.
(2) Grant Fraud
(a) Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
-- An OIG investigation into the misapplication of CETA funds by
a director of a subgrantee has resulted in a guilty plea to
two counts of making false statements in violation of Title 18,
USC, Sec. i001, and a four-year prison sentence. Approximately
$84,000 in CETA funds were misused.
-- After being indicted on 26 counts of CETA fraud, the director
of a 1978 Youth Program has pleaded guilty to two counts of
embezzlement of CETA funds. Approximately $15,000 of CETA
funds were misappropriated. This individual has received a
six-month prison sentence and three years probation.
(b) State Employment Security Agency/Unemployment Insurance (SESA/UI)
-- A joint OIG/Postal Service investigation into the alleged
fraudulent issuance of Trade Readjustment Act payments by a
SESA employee has resulted in a 17 count conviction of theft
of government property and mail fraud and a sentence of
18 months in prison and 5 years probation. The employee
had issued fraudulent checks for approximately $79,750.
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-- A joint OIG/FBI investigation disclosed that officials
of a State Employment Security Agency reported false
placement figures which resulted in DOL supplying
additional, unjustified funding of hundreds of thousands
of dollars to the agency. The former director of the
agency and two other individuals have been indicted
for conspiracy, submission of false statements and
possession of false documents. ETA has been notified
of this problem and has said it is taking corrective
action.
(3) Workers' Compensation Programs
-- Investigation by the OIG, and by other agencies with the
assistance of the OIG, detected a total of $441,420 in actual
J
overpayments of benefits toldlaimants. Such overpayments were
due to fraud on the part of claimants, aided in some cases by
their physicians, attorneys and representatives. While sufficient
evidence to sustain criminal convictions was not obtained in
many cases, the OIG obtained enough evidence to terminate benefits.
-- A conservative estimate of the future cost to the Government
of an average Federal Employee Compensation case is $180,000.
As a result of 13 investigations conducted during the period,
sufficient information was developed and furnished to the
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), which administers
the program, to prevent an estimated $2,408,475 in future overpayments.
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-- The results of a number of OIG initial investigations , together
with comments by prosecutors and judges, disclosed that a number
of forms used in the compensation claims process were subject
to serious abuse. These forms were analyzed by OIG and recommenda-
tions have been made to OWCP regarding the changes needed.
Joint planning for additional changes is in process.
-- A series of Fraud Alert Seminars was initiated in OIG's Field
Program Fraud Investigative Offices to educate investigative
personnel from several Federal agencies in the systems and procedures
of the Federal Employees' Compensation program. Because of our
limited staff, OIG has needed to rely heavily on the investigative
branches of employing agencies in the investigation of fraudulent
FECA claims. Continuing staff limitations make it necessary
to continue to solicit such assistance.
-- An example of our activity in this area was an investigation
into an allegation that ten former employees of the U.S. Navy
Base in Charleston, South Carolina, were working in private
industry while receiving FECA payments for temporary total
disability. Of the ten people investigated, one pled
nolo contendere (no contest) and another pled guilty to
violations of Title 18, USC, Sec. i001 (false statement).
They were both fined and placed on probation. Six had
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their FECA benefits terminated and no action was taken
against the other two. These investigations detected
$85,922 in overpayments. Future losses of approximately
one million dollars were prevented by this project.
-- An OIG investigation in Missouri revealed that a man who had
applied for a job with a local police force was receiving FECA
benefits for temporarY totaldisability. He pled guilty to one
count of Title 18, USC, Sec. 1920 (False Statement to Obtain
Federal Employees' Compensation--a Misdemeanor). He was
fined and placed on probation.
(4) Orsanized Crime
-- The five most influential officers of a large Teamster local
that dominates the New Jersey garbage industry were convicted
for racketeering violations and crimes relating to the abuse
of their positions in order to obtain unsecured bank loans,
and to influence the operation of the union's pension fund.
The magnitude of the fraud was demonstrated by the collapse
of certain of the banks involved upon default of the suspect
loans. Jail sentences ranged from 6 months to 7 years.
The investigation was conducted jointly with other Federal
agencies.
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-- A former top-ranking Teamster official and reputed high-
level syndicate member in New Jersey, and three of his associates,_
were convicted of racketeering. The principal figure was !•_•
•sentenced to 20 years in prison; terms of imprisonment for _his "_i•
associates ranged from 7_to 20 years. This•/!nVest•igation,/•il/ii_{_i•i_i_iiii•i_i_
• conducted jointly with other Federal agencies,disdloSed the • _•
"sweetheart" practice in which union officers agreed not •
to enforce contract provisions favorable to their •members,
in return for substantial bribes from employees.
-- An official of a Laborer's union in New Haven, Connecticut,
and a high-ranking syndicate figure were indicted as accomplices
in the embezzlement of union funds. This, too, was a joint
investigation.
D. Problems Identified as a Result of Investigative Activity
-- Recovery of Overpayments Detected by the OIG
Since OIG investigations of OWCP began, there has been a
dramatic increase in the amount of overpayments detected.
Many of these cases involve individuals who no longer have
compensation payments due them and do not have retirement
contributions or deposits with the Civil Service Commission.
In tbe past, overpayments have been collected by voluntary
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payments from claimants, deducted from future compensation
payments, or assessed against the claimant's Civil Service
retirement contributions. OIG believes that a system of collection
measures should be implemented within OWCP so that overpayments
of funds are properly recovered. OWCP has been informed of
OIG's recommendation, but has not fully developed a program for
the recovery of these overpayments.
-- Problems in the Unemployment Insurance Program
Due to alleged abuse, an employee protection act passed
by Congress and administered by State Employment Security
Agencies has received criticism from the media, the
public, and Congress. A committee appointed by the Secretary
has recommended changes in the procedures for administering
the Act. These changes should solve some of the problems.
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CHAPTER 4. ADP REVIEWS
A. Responsibilities and Functions
The automated data processing (ADP) reviews conducted by the OIG's ADP
Division constitute the Department's evaluation program for computer
facilities and systems. The following are brief descriptions of the types
of ADP reviews conducted:
-- Application Evaluation - An evaluation of a computer system
from three perspectives: (i) whether or not the system is
designed according to management direction and meets legal
requirements; (2) whether the system is effective, efficient
and economical; and (3) whether the system has proper operational
controls and is auditable°
-- Security Evaluation - An evaluation of the security of software
and operating systems, primarily from the perspective of
unauthorized access to critical data files.
-- Operational Evaluation - An evaluation of the complete operation
of a data processing activity in terms of viability, efficiency
and economy.
-- Centralization Review - A review to determine the relative
system life-cycle cost of centralized, as compared with existing
and other modes of ADP operations from the perspective of
cost to federal grant programs.
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-- ADP Cost Determination Review - A review to ensure that incurred
costs are reasonable, allowable and equitably recovered.
B. Workload and Resources
The universe of data processing installations either totally or partially
funded by the Department of Labor includes 52 State Employment Security
Agencies (SESAs), approximately 25 of which utilize centralized state facilities;
CETA state and local prime sponsors with DOL-funded computer installations
operated in conjunction with SESAs; and 4 facilities utilized by the Department
of Labor. There are approximately 50 application systems (computer programs
designed to satisfy user needs) operated at the 4 Departmental installations
which are of particular interest to OIG because they: (i) are national
in scope; (2) are of significantly high cost; (3) play a significant
role in the management decision-making process; or (4) affect disbursement
or control of resources.
Six positions in the ADP Division were allocated to these evaluations
and reviews.
C. Significant Findings and Recommendations Made
We are pleased to note that progress has been made on all of the ADP
review recomrendations made in the last report (See Appendix D for
a list of these recommendations). During the current reporting period,
OIG has issued reports on 7 ADP reviews (These are listed in Appendix
E). Of these reviews, 3 identified significant problems or deficiencies
and are summarized below.
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-- A centralization review found that thestate was proposing
a transfer of administrative control of the State Employment
Security Agency (SESA) computer facility away from the SESA,
using information system consolidation provisions contained
in OMB Circular A-90. OIG found that such a transfer was beyond
the scope of A-90 inasmuch as neither state information systems
nor computer facilities would be consolidated; the net effect
would be an elimination of prior grantor approval associated
with the grant agreement without any offsetting financial or
operational benefits. OIG concluded that the state plan did
not constitute a valid centralization proposal.
-- An operational review found that the SESA had acquired a major
computer system without prior grantor approval and had extended
the life of a systems architecture that had been initially
acquired without competition. OIG recommended that the SESA
conduct a competitive procurement to replace the existing computer
system.
-- An ADP cost determination review found an over-recovery of
$1.4 million resulting from charges to the computer center
users. OIG estimated that between 30-40% of that amount came
from the Federal grantees and recommended that such monies
be returned. The Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare is in the process of effecting recovery.
_ - 51-
CHAPTER 5. FRAUD PREVENTION AND DETECTION ACTIVITIES
During the six months of this reporting period, OIG has increased its
efforts in the area of fraud prevention and detection. The following is
a description of some on-going activities in this area and some
new initiatives which have been implemented.
A. On-going Activities
(i) Fraud and Abuse Prevention Surveys (FAPS)
As described in the previous report, FAPS is a preventive form
of investigation which is used to identify and correct crime-
conducive conditions before fraud and abuse occurs. FAPS are
undertaken by three-person teams (including an investigator,
an auditor and an analyst familar with the program) which are
assigned to survey a DOL program or grantee, check for the
existence of necessary management systems and controls, identify
systems weaknesses and recommend changes in procedures.
Since the implementation of the FAPS program, we have completed
surveys of CETA prime sponsors in Mobile, Alabama and the
Cherokee Nation, Oklahoma and of the Wage-Hour Office in
Glendale, California. In addition, we presently have underway
a FAPS of a CETA subsponsor in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
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(2) OIG Manasement Information System
It is crucial to develop and implement a management information
system which will satisfy OIG's information and reporting needs.
The audit tracking portion of the new system is currently in
program testing; implementation is planned for later in
Fiscal Year 1980. The investigations portion of the system is
currently in the research and planning stage.
(3) Trainin$
The Inspector General has recognized that OIG auditors and
investigators must have additional training in the detection
of fraud and other crimes involving federal monies if OIG is
to be successful in accomplishing its purposes. Since April
1979, approximately 25 auditors and investigators have attended
the White Collar Crime Seminar offered at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center at Glynco, Georgia.
Given the newness of the Offices of Inspector General, training
programs do not yet exist which meet all of the unique skills
and training needs of these offices. We will be examining
those training and development needs which will improve the
skills and capabilities of our entire staff to effectively deal
with the kinds of program initiatives this Office will _e
undertaking. Our goal is to have a comprehensive training and
development plan prepared within the next several months. _
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B. New Activities
(i) Review of the Summer Youth Employment Program
The Office of the Inspector General devoted significant resources
to reviewing the Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP) this
summer. Our decision to allocate resources to this purpose
was attributable, in part, to the February 20, 1979 GAO
report (entitled More Effective Management is Needed to Improve
the Quality of the Summer Youth Employment Program) on the
1978 SYEP, which found that there were significant problems
with the Department's efforts to assure that state and local
governments were operating quality programs.
The OIG effort to improve the 1979 SYEP program involved both
audit and investigative offices. The audit effort was extensive.
Using both CPAs and DOL auditors, the OIG reviewed the SYEP
at 29 Prime Sponsors. Eighty worksites at each of these Prime
Sponsors were reviewed. The objective of the review was to
asse'ss worksite quality, paying particular attention to whether
or not meaningful work was being provided; to assess whether
Prime Sponsors and subsponsors were monitoring the program as
required and doing appropriate follow-up work on the monitoring;
and to test time, attendance and payroll procedures to determine
if there were any ghost employees. Onsite work included
interviewing participants and supervisors, visual observation,
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and scrutiny of time and attendance procedures. In addition,
paycheck distribution was reviewed by the auditors. ETA was
promptly notified of specific programmatic problems uncovered
by the auditors so that immediate corrective action could
be taken.
This review of the 1979 program by the Office of Audit was
unprecedented and involved a significant allocation of our
resources. The Prime Sponsors which were chosen for the review
work included a mix of urban, rural, and Balance of State
Prime Sponsors. The composite of the review should result in
a balanced and representative report on the 1979 Summer Youth
Employment Program. While the onsite work for the audit has
been completed, the results have not yet been fully evaluated.
The Office of Investigations was also directed to prepare for
i
a major effort with regard to the 1979 Summer Youth Employment
Program. We expected a significant number of referrals for
investigation, in part because ETA had planned an extensive
special monitoring program for this year's program. This special
monitoring group was to target its efforts on those Prime Sponsors
where the majority of the problems were expected to exist.
- 55 -
All of our Field Investigations Supervisors were informed
that investigation of Summer Youth Employment Program cases
was to be a priority. However, for reasons that are as yet
uncertain, the number of allegations referred for investigation
has been many fewer than expected. At one point, we identified
processing problems within ETA which resulted in a delay
in the reporting of ETA's complaints to the OIG. The Inspector
General has worked directly with management officials in ETA
to resolve this problem.
(2) Department of Labor OIG Whistleblower Hotline
The Department of Labor's OIG Hotline is a telephone, mail-
in, walk-in complaint program. The main thrust of the Hotline
program is to elicit investigative and audit leads from
employees who ma_ have knowledge of criminal conduct, waste or
mismanagement. The Hotline officially began its operation
on July 24, 1979, and has received approximately 66 complaints
alleging fraud, mismanagement and waste. Some of these
complaints have been programmatic and are more appropriately
handled by the program offices, while others involve fraud
or other wrong-doing and have been investigated by OIG.
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(3) OIG Follow-up on General Accountin 8 Office (GAO) Hotline Complaints
OIG is the conduit for all complaints received through the GAO
hotline concerning Department of Labor programs. Upon receiving
summaries of the complaints from GAO, OIG determines whether
the complaints should be handled within OIG or by the appropriate
DOL agency. From April 4, 1979, when OIG began receiving complaint
summaries to August 27, 1979, OIG had received 118 summaries
from GAO. Of those, 71 were forwarded to the proper DOL agency
for administrative handling. The remaining are being handled
within OIG.
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U. S. Department of Labor InspectorGeneral ._
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MEMORANDUM FOR: All Organized Crime Field Offices
and OC Personnel
FROM : RONABD GOLDSTOCK ?.
Deput;, inspector General
SUBJECT: Organized Crime Prograra Planning
This memo is the first step in what I expect will be the
development and implementation of a comprehensive OIG
program in the area of organized crime/labor racketeering
control. It is the product of my thoughts and the insights
of a number of OIG personnel who have spent a considerable
amount of time thinking about what we ought to be doing.
I start with the premise that control of organized crime
(see attachment for definition of terms) will not be achieved
by the standard practices used to control other types of
crime. It is not sufficient for law enforcement agencies to
investigate isolated crimes, solve them, and present them to
a prosecutor for formal proceedings. The concepts of investi-
gation, prosecution, and incarceration must be employed as
part of pre-determined strategies, if they are to be effective
in an organized crime context.
This idea is hardly new. In 1929 John Landesco concluded in
his classic work, O__anized Crime in Chica__0_:
"Crusades arouse public sentiment against some existing
abuse or disorder, but they are so sweeping in character
that they are usually only temporarily successful and
a reaction sets in against them. One reason for the
failure of crusades against crime and vice is that they
seek to endorse some general policy of law enforcement.
They are seldom or never based on a study of the pro-
blem. What is needed is a program that will deal with
the crime problem J_n detail and consecutively, thfs;:is
by analyzing the crime situation into its diff.erent
elements, by taking up each crime situation sep,?[rate].y,
and one by one.working out 3 constructive solution."
And yet, fifty years later, the single greatest' d.eficiency "in
virtual].y every organized crime control unit in the United
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States, is the failure to develop comprehensive strategies
to address identifiable problems in the organized crime
area. Without the formulation and execution of a coherent
strategy, impact on targeted criminal activity can only be
haphazard. The incarceration of an underworld figure
generally disrupts an individual enterprise, only until
new leadership is established. The disruption is, thus,
often only minimal, and the effect on the general problem
negligible.
To be effective, a general strategy, designed to effect
more than individuals or individual enterprises, must
necessarily take into account the long-range implications
of daily operational tactics. Ultimate success, if it can
be achieved at all, will be the result of years of eroding
the foundations of the targeted criminal activity, rather
than a number of spectacular investigations ending primarily
in headlines for public consumption.
That is not to say that individual cases are not important.
They obviously are, but given limited staffing and financial
resources, we can no longer afford the luxury of conducting
investigations which do not have a significant and lasting
impact on organized crime activity. A nun_er of OIG investi-
gators have indicated that there are occasions whe_L _e might
well consider undertaking investigations that would not tend
to advance a specific strategy. For example, offices might
decide to make cases that are likely to receive substantJal
publicity to demonstrate their effectiveness and to provide
a basis for public and professional support. Certain matters,
too, may have an important symbolic value, and they should be
considered for that purpose. Indeed, one strategy to be
employed might well be symbolic impact, particularly where
current and likely resources preclude any realistic hope of
having a real impact. Still another reason for undertaking
a specific investigation, might be to cooperate with an
agency to provide a basis for future mutual aid. I concur
with these specific targets of opportunity. However, I feel
that the bulk of our resources should be devoted to partici-
pation in pre-determined strategies which have a long-lasting
and significant impact.
To put these concepts into practice, I would like each field
office to prepare a mission statement and strategy papers
so that we can agree upon a set of realistic and concrete
goals keyed to a specific timetable. These planning docu-
ments will also provide some objective standards by which
we can measure our overall program effectiveness in the
organized crime area.
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Each office should prepare one mission statement to include:
-- A description of the geographic jurisdiction
covered by the office.
-- An assessment of the organized crime problem in
the area including (I) a thoughtful analysis of
the current and projected organized crime activ-
ity in the area, the relative strength of such
activity in particular unions, industries or
locations, the importance of certain individuals
in maintaining or expanding organized crime in-
fluence, etc., and (2) an assessment of where OIG
investigative activity can have the greatest and
most lasting impact. In addition to areas in which
corruption is known to exist, consideration should
be given to unions or industries which orqanized
crime syndicates may be attempting to infiltrate.
-- A statement of mission in which realistic program
goals are specifically stated. A goal is not an
investigation, or a series of investigations; it
is what is meant to be accomplished through the
investigative work. These goals should be suffi-
ciently specific and targeted so that implementation
strategies can be devised and so that progress toward
achieving these goals can be meaningfully tracked.
For example, "elimination of labor racketeering in
jurisidiction x" would be too vague. The greater
the specificity of a goal, in terms of union,
industry, location, etc., and of desired end
results, the better.
Secondly, each office should prepare strategy papers for each
goal identified in the mission statement. These papers should
include the following information:
-- A discussion of alternative strategies to achieve
the goals. The discussion must take into account
the impact that each alternative will have on the
targeted activities, syndicates, areas, etc. For
example, will incarceration of an individual or
group of individuals cleanse the union? Can an
investigation focus on bribe-givers who corrupt
large numbers of union officials? Is it possible
to conduct investigations solely for the purpose
of developing informants whose information would
prove valuable in succeeding cases? Would public
disclosure of corrupt activities foster overt dissent
by honest union members?
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-- A consideration of available remedies and investi-
gative techniques. Investigation, prosecution, and
incarceration are clearly the most important remedies
available to law enforcement agencies. However, you
should consider civil approaches as well in the
development of these strategy papers. Also, this
discussion of alternative strategies should include
estimates of the probable reactions of the various
components of the criminal justice system. For
example, can we, given the specific circumstances,
expect substantial sentences upon conviction? Con-
sider, also, the investigative tools available,
including the use of electronic surveillenceo
-- A recommended strategy and action plan covering
staff resources to be utilized, projected timetable,
and evaluation plan, i.e. how we will know when the
program goal has been achieved.
In order that the structure of individual field offices be
compatible with the assumption of innovative and sophisticated
cases, and implementation of strategies, investigators should
be assigned to teams or modules. Each module should consist of
four persons headed by a senior investigator with supervisory
authority over the members of the team. This would result in
close supervision and guidance while giving the supervisor
adequate staff to conduct the investigative work. To the
extent possible, each should be composed of investigators with
diverse investigative experience and should include, where
feasible, an investigative accountant. In recommending an
organization, the supervising agent should list the qualifi-
cations of each of the individuals and his/her area of expertise.
Certain members of OIG have expressed the need for and the
desirability of using the case agent method rather than the
"team approach." It is my view that the establishment of these
modules is not necessarily inconsistent with the use of case
agents. The team supervisor can assign individual responsi-
bility, for certain aspects of the project, to an investigator
who will then become the case agent. Of course, in large
investigations, it makes sense for the team supervisor to be
the case agent.
The agent in charge of the office must exercise supervision
of each of the established modules. In addition, he/she
should have direct supervision over one or two agents who
can handle more limited investigations on an ad hoc basis.
For the purposes of the strategy papers, you should assume
stable personnel resources. However, if you fee] that you
cannot undertake priority projects highlighted in your analysis,
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please indicate in the strategy papers what additional
resources would be required.
I want each supervising agent to be personally responsible
for the development of these materials. However, I hope that
you will consult with others in OIG and knowledgeable persons
throughout the law enforcement community in planning these
projects. Consultation with the Attorney-in-Charge of the
Strike Force is obviously a necessity. Since the projects
resulting from this planning effort will be the major focus
of our program, you might consider holding an all-day brain-
storming session with your agents and others to begin thinking
about and developing a mission statement and strategy papers.
Further, I want to emphasize that the documents resulting from
this planning effort will not be set in concrete. It is clear
that almost every investigation will add to the office's under-
standing of the structure and operations of the underworld
and the labor scene within the office's jurisdiction. Indeed,
as investigators add to their experience, they will add new
skills, learn new methods, develop new insights, and attract
knowledgeable sources of information. As a result, these
papers will be periodically reviewed and if needed, revised.
So that we can reach consensus soon on mission statements and
strategy papers, I am requesting that draft materials be sent
to me two to three weeks after receipt of this memo. Your
materials will then be reviewed in the National Office. Hope-
fully, by the end of October, we will have an established
organized crime program.
I recognize that the establishment of missions papers and the
utilization of pre-determined strategies have not been tradi-
tional approaches in law enforcement. Indeed, even among those
who agree that the use of a mission statement and strategy
papers is ultimately a good idea, there is concern that the
shortage of personnel, high caseloads, and press of operational
duties make the development of these materials an unaffordable
luxury. I find it difficult to concur with that position. If
done properly, the use of such devices will inevitably conserve
resources and manpower by focusing investigations, producing
more rational selection of cases, and avoiding wasted and
unnecessary investigativetime. Thus, while the drafting and
establishment of mission papers and strategies are difficult,
time consuming, and require, what Judge Learned Hand termed
"the intolerable labor of thought," we literally can no longer
afford to do without them.
My goal is that we, in OIG-DOL, be, and be perceived, as the
best agency in the organized crime control community. I
believe the first step in achieving that position be the estab-
lishment of the mission papers and strategies, and that the
second step be their implementation. It is essential that you
give these matters priority attention.
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Bob Nicholson, Stu Eder and I are available at any time to
discuss or expand upon this memo. If you have comments about
the memo or the efficacy of the mission s_tatetuent arid/or
strategies, please don't hesitate to let _e know about thera.
I am planning on receiving a draft by October 19th. We can
then work out a date for discussing the proposals and reaching
a consensus on the organized crime program.
Attachment
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A_j_pendix -- Definition of Terms
The term "organized crime" is obviously subject to many
meanings. At the very least, it can be thought of as being
an "enterprise," "syndicate," or "venture."
"Enterprise" - an organized crime "enterprise" is a criminal
• ;
group that provldes illicit goods or services on a regular
basis. An exemp]e would be a narcotics wholesaler and the
cutting crew. Thus, it is a criminal firm or business
organization.
"Syndicate" - an organized crime "syndicate" is a group that
regulates relations between various "enterprises." It may
be metropolitan, regional, national, or international in
scope. It maybe concerned with only one field of endeavor,
or it may be concerned with a broad range of illicit activ-
ities. A "syndicate", therefore, is a criminal cartel or
business organization. It fixes prices for illicit goods
and services, allocates black markets and territories, acts
as a criminal legislature and court, sets criminal policy,
settles disputes, levies "taxes", and offers protection
from both rival groups and legalprosecution.
"Venture" - a "venture" is a criminal episode usually
engaged in for profit by a group. It may be the hijacking
of a truck or the robbery of a bank. It is "organized crime"
when members of the "venture" have access to superior criminal
resources, including capital, skilled labor, outlets for
stolen property, etc.
For purposes of this memo, I emphasize syndicate crime
because it _s my belief that the greater threat to society
from organized, as opposed to random, crime _:esults from
syndication. Simply state, syndicates provide their members
with the ability to capitalize on oppo_._tunities, as a result
of their connections with diverse individuals and activities,
as well as providing them access to capital, corruption, and
the use of force. The more sophisticated the structure and
membership of the syndicate, ti_e more difficult it is for
law enforcement to disrupt the criminal members and their
activities.
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APPENDIX D
Action on Recommendations Contained in ADP Reviews
October i, 1978 - March 31, 1979
During the October I, 1978-March 31, 1979 reporting period, OIG issued
seven ADP reviews. Of these reviews, four identified significant problems
or deficiencies and are summarized below:
-- During the centralization review of Minnesota's proposal to consolidate
computer operations, it was found that the Minnesota State Information
Division had amassed over $4.3 million in retained earnings
resulting from charges to the computer center users. OIG estimated
that between 25-30 percent of that amount came from Federal grantees
and recommended that such monies be returned. The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare is in the process of effecting
recovery.
-- An application survey of the Black Lung ADP system found that
management controls and definitions were lacking, planning was
deficient, and existing equipment and software were not adequate.
Among other things, it was recommended that a senior technical
manager be assigned to the project, and that the equipment in place
be upgraded. The Employment Standards Administration (ESA) is in
the process of implementing these recommendations.
APPENDIX D (CONT'D)
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-- An application survey of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act
(FECA) ADP system found that the system had been reduced from planned
capabilities. The review also disclosed ESA management had not
effectively controlled and directed the ADP operations of the FECA
program, and had notadequately addressed the total cost of its
FECA ADP operations. OIG recommended that Departmental management
require an impact analysis balancing capital, development and
future operational costs against current operational costs before
approving any additional funding or FECA ADP system development.
-- The OIG's ADP security review of the Colorado Division of Employment
and Training (CDET) found that the Unemployment Insurance
system was vulnerable to embezzlement and to data destruction or
loss, and that the wage and tax subsystems were unauditable.
OIG recommended various methods to minimize the specific risks
that were identified, and that unauditable subsystems be documented.
CDET has implemented, or is in the process of implementing,
many of the specific recommendations.
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APPENDIX E
List of ADP Review Reports
Issued April i, 1979 through September 30, 1979
Name of Review Entity Type of Review
i. Iowa Department of Job Service ADP Operational Evaluation Report
2. West Virginia Department of ADP Cost Determination Report
HumanResources
3. Oregon Department of Human Resources ADP Cost Determination and
Centralization Report
4. Maine Department of Finance and ADP Cost Determination and
Administration Centralization Report
5. Alaska Department of Administration ADP Cost Determination Report and
ADP Centralization Report
6. Wisconsin Department of Industry, ADP Centralization Report
Labor and Human Resources
7. Optimum Systems, Inc. ADP Service Contract Review -
Management Letter
